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COMMENT
Patient Coercion by Hospitals: A Comparison
of Antitrust Standards in Hyde and Rumple
INTRODUCTION
This Comment concerns the potential impact of the Supreme Court's
decision in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde' on the Indiana
case of Rumple v. Bloomington Hospital,2 with respect to the Supreme
Court's analysis of tying arrangements3 between hospitals and health care
professionals. The issue reflects a recent and growing trend in the application
of antitrust law to the health care industry. Because the Indiana antitrust
statute is patterned after the federal antitrust statute, the standards and tests
set forth by the federal courts are particularly applicable to Indiana cases.
Further, the Supreme Court decisions will affect the policies of hospitals
and other health care institutions in the state.
This Comment initially considers the health care industry and the appli-
cation of the antitrust laws to the industry. Against this background, the
tests enunciated by the Supreme Court in Hyde are applied to the hospital
policy in Rumple for an analysis of the tying arrangement. As a result of
the analysis, this Comment proposes less restrictive alternative policies for
the hospital and concludes that the factual situation, as presented in Rumple,
should be deemed an illegal tying arrangement under the standards of Hyde.
1. 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
2. 422 N.E.2d 1309 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981), transfer denied, 429 N.E.2d 214 (Ind. 1981).
3. The tying arrangement must include four elements to sustain an antitrust violation: (1)
two separate products (tying product and tied product) must be present; (2) the seller must
have sufficient market power in the tying product to coerce purchase of the tied product; (3)
a not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce must be involved; and (4) anticompetitive
effects in the market must be shown. Bob Maxfield, Inc. v. A.M.C., 637 F.2d 1033, 1037 (5th
Cir. 1981). See United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610 (1977); Fortner
Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1 (1958).
The Supreme Court in Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976),
largely eliminated the interstate commerce defense as a mechanism for health care providers
to avoid antitrust scrutiny. The third requirement does not warrant further discussion in the
text. The Court held that the requisite substantial impact on interstate commerce could be
based upon a hospital's receipt of Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement. Any hospital receiving
such reimbursement payments would have the nexus required for the application of the Sherman
Act. See Rich, Medical Staff Privileges and the Antitrust Laws, 2 WHrirMR L. REV. 667, 674
(1980); Note, Antitrust-Implied Repeal of the Antitrust Laws by the National Health Planning
Act, 56 TJL. L. REv. 749, 752 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Antitrust-Implied Repeal].
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I. BACKGROUND
The health care industry is big business, accounting for 10.5% of the 1982
gross national product. 4 National health expenditures in 1981 reached almost
$300 billion5 and recent projections suggest that by 1990 $750 billion will
be spent on health care annually. 6 The health care industry is reportedly the
country's second largest employer.7 Both the rapid rise in the cost of medical
care I and the growth of the health care industry have led to increasing
antitrust scrutiny. Most antitrust challenges in the health care industry are
brought under section one of the Sherman Act.9 Since Indiana's antitrust
statute' ° is patterned after the Sherman Act, state courts must consider
decisional law under the Act in construing the Indiana statutes."
For several years, the medical and legal professions maintained that their
practice was a public service and not a "trade" within the language of the
Sherman Act. The professions claimed to be exempt from the statute as a
result of this interpretation. To support the exemption argument, the profes-
sions relied upon the dicta in several cases where the Supreme Court distin-
4. Pankau, Health Law: How Should Medical Care Be Provided?, 58 FLA. B. 135 (1984).
5. Weller, The Primacy of Standard Antitrust Analysis in Health Care, 14 TOLEDO L.
REV. 609 n.1 (1983).
6. Halper, The Health Care Industry and the Antitrust Laws: Collision Course?, 49
ANTITRUST L.J. 17, 18 n.5 (1981).
7. Id. at 18.
8. The cost-reimbursement system has been blamed for the rising costs. See Waxman,
Keynote Address: National Concerns for the Future of Health Care, 2 WHITTIER L. REV. 635
(1980); Wood, The Chairman's Corner, HEALTH LAW., Fall 1983, at 2. "The natural incentives
of these payment programs have been characterized by an absence of negative constraints on
intermediate products by the patient population." Id. at 2. The lack of cost control incentive
has resulted in excessive and unnecessary tests and procedures. See, e.g., Rumple v. Bloomington
Hosp., 422 N.E.2d 1309 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). This inefficiency has led to higher overall
consumer costs. Note, Health Law-The Conflict with Antitrust Law- National Gerimedical
Hospital & Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591
n.1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Health Law-The Conflict]. However, a DRG (diagnosis related
groups) reimbursement system for Medicare hospitalization costs could have a major impact
on cost control efforts. The limit on reimbursement creates an incentive to hold down unnec-
essary expense by eliminating superfluous tests and lengthy hospitalizations. Ward, Washington
Watch, 26 REs GEsTAE 554 (1983).
9. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). The purpose of the Sherman Act is "to prevent and control
combinations made with the view to prevent competition, or for the restraint of trade, or to
increase the profits of the producer at the cost of the consumer." Speech by Senator Sherman
before the United States Senate (Mar. 21, 1890). Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares illegal
any "contract, combination,. . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce .. " 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section 2 of the Act prohibits monopolization or attempts to monopolize
a relevant area of commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
10. In-pertinent part, IND. CODE § 24-1-2-1 (1982) provides: "Every scheme, contract, or
combination in restraint of trade or commerce.. .' is illegal ...."
I1. Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917
(1979); Orion's Belt, Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 433 F. Supp. 301 (S.D. Ind. 1977).
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guished a "profession" from a "trade" as used under Sherman section 1.12
Giving due consideration to the dicta, the federal courts formulated a "learned
professions" exemption.
The virtual absence of antitrust enforcement in the health care
field'3substantially contributed to the illusion that special treatment of the
profession was warranted.' 4 In fact, immunity from antitrust laws is not
generally favored,' 5 and public policy dictates a narrow construction of
antitrust law exemptions.' 6 The Supreme Court follows public policy by
narrowly construing the learned professions exemption17 and, as a result,
continues to scrutinize the health care industry under antitrust law.' 8
12. People v. Roth: Should Physicians Be Exempt from New York Antitrust Law?, 2 PACE
L. REV. 273, 275 n.20 (1982) [hereinafter cited as New York Antitrust Law].
13. But see American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943) (in which the
Supreme Court did not accord doctors special treatment in antitrust analysis, rather they
affirmed the conviction of the AMA for suppressing competition).
14. Weller, supra note 5, at 613.
15. Note, Antitrust-Implied Repeal, supra note 3, at 754.
16. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Berry, 438 U.S. 531, 551-52 (1978). See Note,
Antitrust-McCarran Act, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 426, 431-32 n.43 (1983).
17. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975) (holding that the "nature
of an occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the Sherman Act" and that
the "public-service aspect of professional practice" is not determinative of the coverage of the
antitrust law); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)
(dismissing the hope provided by footnote 17 of the Goldfarb case that the learned professions
would be treated differently due to the public service nature of the professions. The Court
held that the "central principle of antitrust analysis" nevertheless remains the same for the
professions: unreasonable restraints of trade are illegal, and the focus of the question of
"reasonableness" must be upon the "restraint's impact on competitive conditions," not upon
professional policies which the restraint may help to promote).
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has also been particularly active in applying antitrust
analysis to the health care profession. In Ballard v. Blue Shield of S.W. Va., 543 F.2d 1075
(4th Cir. 1976), the court applied Goldfarb to the medical profession by ruling that the
professional status of doctors alone did not exempt them from the Sherman Act. In Virginia
Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981), the court, relying on Professional Eng'rs declaration that "it is
not the function of a group of professionals to decide that competition is not beneficial in
their line of work," 435 U.S. at 690, held that anticompetitive conduct is not to be condoned
"upon an incantation of 'good medical practice.' " 624 F.2d at 485.
18. National Gerimedical Hosp. and Gerontology Center v. Blue'Cross of Kansas City, 452
U.S. 378 (1981). The National Health Planning and Resources Development Act did not "create
a 'pervasive' repeal of the antitrust laws as applied to every action in response to the health-
care planning process." Id. at 393. But see id. at 393 n.18 (where the Court again limits the
holding to "not foreclose future claims of antitrust immunity in other factual contexts"). The
National Health Planning and Resources Development Act is found at 88 Stat. 2225 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300k (1982)). The goal of the NHPRDA is "the strengthening of
competitive forces in the health services industry wherever competition and consumer choice can
constructively serve . . . to advance the purposes of quality assurance, cost effectiveness, and
access." 42 U.S.C. § 300k-2(a)(17) 11 (1982).
For other sources scruntinizing the health care industry under antitrust law see Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984) (applied antitrust principles to an
exclusive contract between the hospital and an anesthesiologists' group in the context of a tying
arrangement); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (application
19861
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II. SPECIAL FEATURES OF THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
The primary objectives of the health care industry are to provide quality
care and to encourage the containment of otherwise exorbitant costs.' 9 Critics
charge that the health care system is "inflationary, and rewards waste,
inefficiency, duplication of services [and] overutilization. '20 One explanation
is that the economic structure of the health care industry operates in a
dysfunctional market. 2' The supply and demand for health care services are
artificial. 22 Price competition among physicians, hospitals and other providers
is the crucial missing link in the market structure. 23 Competition among
doctors, if any, is based on quality. 24 No price competition exists among
hospitals because the patient delegates to the physician the authority to
determine the patient demand for medical service and limits the provider of
the services to the hospital where the physician has staff privileges. 25
Reasoning that competition in the atypical health care market may not
have the same effect as in other commercial markets, 26 two commentators
argue that the health care industry should be accorded special antitrust
standards. 27 In fact, a congressional report concluded that the "health care
industry does not respond to classic market place forces." '28 The Supreme
Court in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, however, held that
the argument that "the health care industry was ... far removed from the
competitive model" did not justify unique antitrust rules. 29
of the per se rule to price fixing in the health care industry); Weller, supra note 5, at 615. But
see Halper, Hospital Medical Staff Cases Under the Antitrust Laws: A Status Report 1, 4 (Feb.
2, 1984) (Paper presented at the A.B.A. Joint Program on Competition, Economic Change
and Antitrust Issues in the Health Care Industry available from the A.B.A).
19. Halper, supra note 6, at 19.
20. Merriman, Private Initiatives and Concerns in Health Care Cost Containment, HEALTH
LAW., Fall 1983, at 6.
21. Note, Health Law-The Conflict, supra note 8, at 597.
22. Shapiro, Cost, Containment in the Health Care Field and the Antitrust Laws, 7 AM.
J.L. & MED. 425, 434 (1982).
23. Weller, supra note 5, at 619.
24. Norris & Szabo, Communication Between the Antitrust and the Health Law Bars:
Appeals for More Effective Dialogue and a New Rule of Reason, 7 AM. J.L. MED. iii (1982).
25. Waxman, supra note 8, at 637; see Dos Santos v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical
Center, 684 F.2d 1346, 1355 (7th Cir. 1982).
26. Some aspects of competition in the health care market will lead to an increase in hospital
charges. For example, proprietary hospitals want to compete, but only to maximize profits,
not to maintain costs. Note, Health Law-The Conflict, supra note 8, at 608 n.148.
27. See Hyde, 686 F.2d 286; Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738
(1976).
28. S. REP. No. 1285, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 7842, 7878.
29. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 350 (1982).
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III. ANTITRUST LAW APPLICATION TO THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
The courts uniformly have employed two basic analyses,30 the per se rule
and the rule of reason, in determining whether the Sherman Act has been
violated. 3' In Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States 2 the Supreme
Court explained the per se violation:
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their per-
nicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
excuse for their use .... Among the practices which the courts have
heretofore deemed to be unlawful in and of themselves are price fixing;
division of markets; group boycotts; and tying arrangements.33
A tying arrangement is defined as "an agreement by a party to sell one
[tying] product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a
different [tied] product . . . -34 Although the Court announced a strict per
se treatment of tying arrangements, consideration of market power and
amount of commerce, plus recognition of some defenses, transform the rule
against tying into a "near" per se rule. 35 The Court, by a bare majority,
continues to hold the "near" per se rule applicable to tying arrangements.
3 6
30. In Veizaga v. National Bd. for Respiratory Therapy, 1977 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,274
(N.D. Ill. 1977), the court suggests a two-step analysis involving, first, a determination whether
the challenged activity, by its nature and character, is "commercial," and second a determination
of the appropriate approach. If the activity is commercial, a per se approach may be taken.
If it is noncommercial, the rule of reason should apply. Halper, supra note 6, at 28.
31. Justice Brandeis in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918),
provided the classic statement on the rule of reason standard:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress
or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed
to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought
to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will
save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge
of intent may help the court to interpret facts and predict consequences.
32. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
33. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
34. Id.
35. Comment, The Single Product Issue in Recent Tying Litigation, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
871, 872.
36. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984). Justices Stevens,
Black, and White in the opinion of the Court and Justices Brennan and Marshall in their
concurrence, adhere to the precedent that "tying arrangements are subject to evaluation for
per se illegality under § 1 of the Sherman Act." Id. at 1569. While concurring in the judgment
of the Court, Justices O'Conner, Powell, and Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger argue that
the per se rule should be abandoned in favor of the rule of reason. Id. at 1569 (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
1986]
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In Jefferson Parish Hospital v. Hyde, the Court presents the issue as a
two-step analysis. The first step is to consider whether the exclusive contract
gives rise to a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. If not, the
second step is to determine whether the contract is nevertheless illegal because
it unreasonably restrains competition. 37 The second step, the rule of reason,
has been applied to the health care field in order to consider the substantial
benefit and pro-competitive justifications. 31
Hyde is the most recent Supreme Court case applying the antitrust laws
to tying arrangements between health care professionals and hospitals. The
case involved Hyde, a board-certified anesthesiologist, who applied for ad-
mission to the medical staff of East Jefferson Hospital. The credentials
committee and the medical staff executive committee recommended approval,
but the hospital board denied the application because the hospital was a
party to a contract providing that all required anesthesiological services be
performed by one specific firm of anesthesiologists. Hyde then commenced
an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the contract was unlawful and
further sought an injunction ordering the hospital to appoint him to the
hospital staff. The district court denied relief, finding under a rule of reason
analysis that the anti-competitive consequences of the contract were minimal
and Were outweighed by benefits of improved patient care.39 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the hospital had sufficient market
power in the tying product, (its operating rooms), to coerce the purchase
of the tied product, (anesthesiological services); therefore, its exclusive con-
tract with the professional medical corporation was rendered an illegal tying
arrangement under a per se analysis.4 The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the record contained no evidence that the hospital forced any services
on unwilling patients and therefore did not give rise to a per se violation.4'
The Court further held that there was insufficient evidence to prove an
unreasonable restraint of competition.4 2
37. Id. at 1554.
38. See, e.g., Dos Santos v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical Center, 684 F.2d 1346 (7th
Cir. 1982); Stone v. William Beaumont Hosp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 54,681 (E.D. Mich.
1983); McElhinney v. Medical Protective Co., 549 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Ky. 1982); Smith v.
Northern Michigan Hosps., 518 F. Supp. 644 (W.D. Mich. 1981). The dissent in Maricopa
argued that "the per se label should not be assigned without carefully considering substantial
benefits and procompetitive justifications". Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457
U.S. 332, 364 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). See also Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d
932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970) (quality of care justifications in health care,
as in other areas of antitrust law, may help avoid per se treatment).
39. 513 F. Supp. 532 (E.D. La. 1981).
40. 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982).
41. 104 S. Ct. at 1567.
42. Id. at 1568. There was no evidence that the price, quality or supply or demand for
either the tying product or the tied product had been adversely affected by the exclusive contract,
and no showing that the market as a whole had been affected at all by the contract.
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Rumple v. Bloomington Hospital43 is the leading Indiana case in the
construction and application of the Indiana antitrust statute to such tying
arrangements. Rumple was injured in an accident and was taken to Bloom-
ington Hospital for x-rays and treatment. Dr. Doster examined x-rays of
his wrist, reduced the fracture, and placed the wrist in a cast. Dr. Hammer,
a radiologist, reviewed the x-rays that evening, after Rumple had gone home,
and made an official interpretation confirming Dr. Doster's diagnosis. The
review of the x-rays by Dr. Hammer was done pursuant to Bloomington
Hospital's policy that each x-ray taken must be interpreted by a radiologist.
All radiologists practicing at the hospital were members of the Southern
Indiana Radiological Association (SIRA), a medical corporation. Radiol-
ogists do not order x-rays to be taken, but rather interpret x-rays ordered
by other physicians. Accordingly, SIRA billed Rumple for Dr. Hammer's
interpretation of the wrist x-rays. Rumple refused to pay the bill and sought
a declaratory judgment of nonliability for payment. The court held that
Bloomington Hospitals policy requiring the interpretation of x-rays by a
radiologist was reasonable. 4 It also held that SIRA did not maintain a
monopoly on the interpretation of x-rays at Bloomington Hospital. 45 In
affirming the lower court's decision, the Indiana Court of Appeals found
no violation of Indiana's antitrust statute. The hospital's policy, according
to the court of appeals, did not establish an illegal monopoly, and the
relationship between the hospital and the association was not an illegal tying
arrangement.4 The Indiana Supreme Court denied petition to transfer.
4 7
The hospital policy, requiring that, in addition to the interpretation of
the attending physician, there must be an official interpretation by a ra-
diologist of all x-rays, 4n 'forces the patient to buy services he might not
otherwise purchase. This appears to be an example of a classic tying ar-
rangement. The hospital agrees to sell the tying product (the x-rays and reading
by the physician), only on the condition that the patient purchase the tied
product (reading of the x-rays by the radiologist). This policy results in
higher, often unnecessary, costs to the patient. It also forces the patient to
purchase the radiologist's additional interpretation of the x-ray in order to
receive the medical treatment at the hospital.4 9
43. 422 N.E.2d 1309 (Ind. Ct. App.), transfer denied, 429 N.E.2d 214 (Ind. 1981).
44. 422 N.E.2d at 1311.
45. Id.
46. 422 N.E.2d at 1309.
47. 429 N.E.2d 214.
48. 422 N.E.2d at 1318.
49. For a more detailed analysis of the harms of tying arrangements, see infra notes 69-87
and accompanying text.
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IV. APPLICATION OF HYDE TO RUMPLE
The existence of a tying arrangement is determined by characterizing the
transaction as involving dual products and attributing economic power to
the seller. If the transaction is defined as involving a single product, then
by definition, no tying has occurred and the analysis stops. If the transaction
is defined as involving dual products, then the analysis continues to determine
the economic power of the seller. This power must be shown in order to
establish the coercion of the consumer.
A. Two Products
The characterization of the transaction as single or dual products is a
threshold question which can determine the outcome of the litigation. This
determination is particularly difficult in the health care industry since the
provider market is fragmented. 0 The hospital's position is that only one
product, a functionally integrated package of services, is provided.' This
single product embraces everything that occurs in the hospital from the
arrival of a patient until he leaves. The services by subspecialists, such as
radiologists, pathologists, and surgeons are also included in this package of
services. The patient's contrary position is that two products exist: the
hospital's services and the subspecialists' services.
The Supreme Court in Hyde utilized the test provided in United States v.
Jerrold Electronics Corp.12 The Jerrold test examines market practices to
50. See Weller, supra note 5, at 620; Payton, A Theory and Model of Non-Price Competition
Among Hospitals 5 (Feb. 3, 1984) (Paper presented at the A.B.A. Joint Program on Com-
petition, Economic Change and Antitrust Issues in the Health Care Industry available from
the A.B.A.). "Although doctors and hospitals produce complementary products and are func-
tionally integrated, they are not economically integrated; nor do they function quite, or only,
as buyers and sellers of services to one another .... Since doctors function as purchasing
agents for patients, from the hospital's point of view the doctor is both labor and consumer."
Id.
51. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1561 n.27 (1984)
(Physical facilities include operating room, the recovery room, and the hospital room where
the patient stays before and after the operation. The services include those provided by staff
physicians, such as radiologists or pathologists, and interns, nurses, dietitians, pharmacist and
laboratory technicians); McElhinney v. Medical Protective Co., 549 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Ky.
1982) (the product market was the furnishing of medical services and supplies by the hospital
and the individual doctors as a joint venture); Panaro v. Palm Beach-Martin County Medical
Center, No. 82-539 CA(L) 01 0 (Palm Beach Cir. Ct. July 11, 1983) (a single product, including
hospital and operating rooms, equipment, medical services, nurses and other ancillary health
services, was provided by the hospital). But see Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1562 n.30 (where the Court
cites to several examples of cases where arrangements involving functionally linked products
were found to be tying devices).
52. 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). The court
in Jerrold Electronics stated:
There are several facts presented in this record which tend to show that a com-
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determine the existence of either single or dual products. The test instructs
a court to first compare the practices of competitors offering similar prod-
ucts, either singly or in a package, to the challenged transaction. If com-
petitors also offer similar products only in a package, the Court favors a
single product determination. The test requires that a court then inspect the
variation of components within the packages offered. If the same components
are always offered in the packages, the provider is considered to offer a
single product. The test further requires a court to audit the method of
billing the purchaser, either by component or by entire package. If the
purchaser is billed for the entire package, the result is a single product.
Finally, the test instructs a court to investigate the extent to which the
provider offered the component separately for sale. If the components are
only sold in a package and not by themselves, a single product exists.53
The Hyde Court found that two products existed. The Court's conclusion
was based on application of the Jerrold analysis. First, other hospitals
permitted separate purchase of anesthesiological services, indicating an in-
dustry practice contrary to that of the defendant hospital. Second, the services
provided by individual anesthesiologists were not exactly the same. The
variation removed the services from the single product category. Third, the
anesthesiological services were billed separately from the other hospital serv-
ices indicating a separate charge for each of the two products. Finally, the
hospital required that all purchases of anesthesiological services be from one
firm, although other anesthesiologists were available to perform the same
services.5 4
In Rumple, the issue confronting the Indiana Supreme Court should have
been whether the hospital policy requiring a radiologist to read all x-rays
constituted single or dual products. The hospital asserted that the x-ray and
its interpretation constituted one product. 55 The patient's position, the correct
one under the Jerrold test, was that the tying product consisted of the x-
ray and its interpretation by the attending physician while the separate tied
product was the second required x-ray interpretation by the radiologist.
munity television antenna system cannot properly be characterized as a single
product. Others who entered the community antenna field offered all of the
equipment necessary for a complete system, but none of them sold their gear
exclusively as a single package as did Jerrold. The record also establishes that the
number of pieces in each system varied considerably so that hardly any two
versions of the alleged product were the same. Furthermore, the customer was
charged for each item of equipment and not a lump sum for the total system.
Finally, while Jerrold had cable and antennas to sell which were manufacturered
by other concerns, it only required that the electronic equipment in the system
be bought from it.
187 F. Supp. at 559.
53. Comment, supra note 35, at 879.
54. 104 S. Ct. at 1564 n.39.
55. 422 N.E.2d at 1314.
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If a court finds affirmative answers to the questions of whether the policy
requiring separate purchase of a radiologist's interpretation of x-rays is
unique to the individual hospital and contrary to the general practice of
Indiana hospitals; and whether the hospital sent a bill for the service of
taking the x-ray and its interpretation by the attending physician, while the
radiologist sent another, separate bill for the additional interpretation of x-
rays, then the courts should give serious consideration to the existence of
dual products and the possibility of a tying arrangement. 6
B. Economic Power
Another essential element of a tying offense is that the seller possesses
"appreciable economic power" in the market for the tying product. 7 The
Supreme Court in United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises (Fortner
II) framed the inquiry as:
Whether the seller has the power within the market for the tying product,
to raise prices or to require purchasers to accept burdensome terms that
could not be exacted in a completely competitive market. In short, the
question is whether the seller has some advantage not shared by his
competitors in the market for the tying product.18
The proper inquiry is whether the hospital has the power to force the patient
to accept the tying product.
The essential query within the relevant market is whether the patient is
the real purchaser of the ancillary medical services. 9 The hospital regards
itself as the purchaser in view of its responsibility for assuring the availability
of such services for patients and its potential liability for negligent rendition
of such services in the hospital. The hospital further claims that while the
patient receives the services, he does so without making any significant
56. Given the factual context of Rumple, the courts might. also want to consider whether
the radiologist considers his services as separate from those provided by the hospital; whether
the physician views the interpretation by the radiologist as an additional procedure; and whether
the patient receives treatment before the interpretation by the radiologist, making it an unnec-
essary procedure.
57. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610 (1977). See also Note,
Hospital Shared Purchasing Agreements After White & White Inc. v. American Hospital Supply
Corp., 14 LoY. U. Cm. L.J. 305, 323 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Hospital Shared Purchasing].
58. Hyde, 686 F.2d at 290 (quoting Fortner 11, 429 U.S. at 620-21) (emphasis added).
59. There is a split among the courts as to whether the patient or the provider is the buyer.
For cases holding that the patient is the buyer, see Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842
(W.D. Pa. 1981); Bartholomew v. Virginia Chiropractics Ass'n, 612 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980). For cases holding that the provider is the buyer, see Hyde,
686 F.2d 286; Dos Santos v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical Center, 684 F.2d 1346 (7th Cir.
1982); United States v. American Soc'y of Anesthesiologists, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 147 (S.D.N.Y.
1979). The characterization of the economic relationships could alter the definition of the
relevant market. See, e.g., Twin City Sports Serv., Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d
1291 (9th Cir. 1982).
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economic decision.60 If the hospital is the purchaser of the radiological
association's services, the purchase would be characterized as a vertical
integration of services, rather than as a tying arrangement. 6' The correct
analysis, however, is that the patient, as ultimate consumer, is the purchaser
of the hospital and radiological services. Specifically, the patient is respon-
sible for paying the bill, either through an insurer or out-of-pocket. 62
An example of a consent form indicated that the hospital and physicians
disclaim being the purchasers of radiological services, and place the patient
in the position of purchaser. The typical consent form provides: "I under-
stand that the ... person or persons performing services involving pathology
and radiology are not the agents, servants or employees of Bloomington
Hospital nor of any surgeon, but are independent contractors and as such
are the agents, servants, or employees of myself [patient]. '63 While the
consent form was designed to avoid tort liability of the hospital and referral
physicians for negligence on the part of subspecialists, in fact it also serves
as an admission that the patient is the purchaser of such services. 64
A clearer understanding of the patient as purchaser is gained by analogizing
the pattern of consumption of medical services to car repairs. When a car
needs servicing, an owner takes it to a repair shop. When a body is in need
of repair the person goes to a hospital. A mechanic examines the car and
indicates the repairs that must be made. A doctor likewise examines the
patient and recommends a course of treatment. The mechanic serves as the
car owner's agent in acquiring the necessary parts to repair the car. The
physician functions as the agent for the patient in selecting medical subspe-
cialists. 65 The car owner is the ultimate purchaser of the parts. Regardless
of whether the mechanic has the parts on hand or must purchase them from
a supplier, the owner views the repair shop as the seller of the service of
repairing his car. The same view is true of the medical services provided by
60. Dos Santos, 684 F.2d at 1354 (The patient does not make economic decisions because
the doctor selects subspecialists and insurance pays the bill). See Note, Federal Antitrust Law
and Hospital Closed Staffs Through Exclusive Contracts: Will the Supreme Court Provide the
Necessary Legal Guidance in Deciding Jefferson Parrish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde?, 28
ST. Louis U.L.J. 511, 523-26 (1984) (policy discussion of hospital as purchaser distinguishing
between ultimate consumer and primary consumer).
61. See Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1561; Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S.
738 (1976). "If the product market is defined as the market for anesthesia services to a hospital,
then there has been no tying, as the provider of services, here the physician group, has not
conditioned the provision of the services on the hospital's acceptance of a tied product." Bates,
Exclusive Arrangements for In-Hospital Professional Services: Does Hyde Mark a Watershed?,
14 U. TOL. L. REv. 639, 650 (1983).
62. American Soc'y of Anesthesiologists, 473 F. Supp. at 150-51.
63. Rumple v. Bloomington Hosp., 422 N.E.2d 1309, 1312 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
64. The language of the consent form also serves as evidence that the radiological services
are a separate and distinct product from the services provided by the hospital in taking the x-
rays and the attending physician in reading the x-rays.
65. Payton, supra note 50, at 5.
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the hospital. The patient, as purchaser, pays the hospital for the medical
services received and views the hospital as the seller of such services.
If a court finds the patient to be the real purchaser of medical services,
the second level of inquiry is whether the hospital has market power. The
hospital would be deemed to have sufficient market power if, within the
market for the tying product (the x-rays and reading by the physician), the
hospital requires the patient to accept the burdensome terms of the tied
product (the reading of the x-rays by the radiologist), when a similar re-
quirement could not be exacted in a completely competitive market. The
Hyde decision provides no guidance in determining market power. While
the court indicated that the existence of market imperfections6 was insuf-
ficient to "generate the kind of market power that justifies condemnation
of tying," 67 such power might be inferred if the patient does not have the
option of going to a competing hospital to avoid the tie. A patient, however,
might not have the option of going to a different hospital if the policy is
widespread; if the community in which the patient resides has only one
hospital; or if an emergency requires care at the nearest hospital. This market-
share analysis of a seller has been adopted by the Supreme Court to establish
sufficient market power. 68
Once a tying arrangement is said to exist, the court must decide if it is
illegal. This decision requires an examination of the harms caused by the
tying arrangement. Under the near per se rule, the court will balance these
harms against the justifications given for the policy.
C. The Nature of the Coercion
There are two evils 69 inherent in a tying arrangement. First, the market
forecloses competitors who, as a result, are denied access to customers in
the tied product market. 70 Second, the buyer's free choice is pre-
66. See Hyde, 686 F.2d 286 (The prevalence of third party payors in system; patients lack
incentive to comparison shop; patients lack information about services they purchase; and
patients choose hospitals by location, rather than by chance to avoid extra charges).
67. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1566.
68. See United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974); United States v.
DuPont & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345
U.S. 594 (1953).
69. The Chicago School views tying arrangements as nonproblems, arguing if one tries to
prevent such arrangements, the hospital will be able to raise their prices due to their market
power. The Chicago School concludes that the manner of exploitation is irrelevant. See R.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PROSPECTIVE 171-84 (1976); R. BORK, THE ANTrrRusT
PARADOX 365-81 (1978).
70. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1568 n.51; International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392,
396 (1942): United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962). Exclusive contracts between
hospitals and subspecialists provide an opportunity for tying. The exclusive contract provides
that only physicians who are parties to the contracts may be granted clinical privileges in a
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cluded.7 1 Both evils exist in the health care industry. The tying arrangement
constitutes an unreasonable restraint on competition since it prevents other
subspecialists 72 from entering that part of the service market controlled by
the hospital. This artificially lowers the supply of subspecialists in the area
and reduces the incentive for improving or initiating techniques or proce-
dures. 73 More importantly, the tie eliminates the patient's choice of medical
services at the hospital. This violates the goal of antitrust law, which is to
allow the consumer to make buying decisions without being subject to
economic coercion.
74
In Hyde, the Court emphasized the importance of the coercion element:
[T]he essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the
seller's exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the
buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not
want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different
terms .... ['1) By conditioning his sale of one commodity on the purchase
of another, a seller coerces the abdication of buyers' independent judg-
ment as to the 'tied' product's merits and insulates it from the competitive
stresses of the open market.' 6
The Court dismissed the idea that packaged sales are inherently anticom-
petitive. The arrangement must force the patient to purchase services as a
given speciality. Walbot & Panaku, Antitrust, Public Health-Care Institutions, and the Devel-
oping Law, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 385, 404. Such arrangements take various forms, e.g., employer/
employee, independent contractor, and contain various financial provisions, e.g., independent
billing, fee for service, percentage of the gross. Fishman, Exclusive Hospital-Based Physician
Contracts and Related Antitrust Considerations 1 (Oct. 3, 1983) (Paper presented at the National
Lawyers Association Conference on Health Contracts). The collision of competition and ex-
clusivity has resulted in numerous antitrust challenges. The exclusive contracts can have both
procompetitive and anticompetitive aspects, and the fact situation governs. See FTC Advisory
Opinion to Burnham Hosp., 101 F.T.C. 991, 993 (Feb. 24, 1983) (procompetitive benefits).
While the Hyde case also involves an exclusive dealing contract, Justice Stevens indicates that
"[t]he issue here is whether the hospital's insistence that its patients purchase anesthesiological
services from Roux creates a tying arrangement." Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1561 n.28.
71. Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498-99 (1969) (quoting
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958)); Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 605.
This interest involves the patient's right to assemble a preferred array of practitioners, settings
and services. The right to choose involves nothing less dramatic than the right to control what
happens to one's body. Dolan & Ralston, Hospital Admitting Privileges and the Sherman Act,
18 Hous. L. REV. 707, 721 (1981).
72. Subspecialists include the major departments of Emergency Room, Anesthesiology,
Radiology and Pathology, and the lesser departments of Respiratory Therapy, Cardiac Cath-
erization and Nuclear Medicine. See Fishman, supra note 70.
73. See Hyde, 686 F.2d 286. The market foreclosure argument is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
74. Id. See also Blair & Finci, The Individual Coercion Doctrine and Tying Arrangements:
An Economic Analysis, 10 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 531 (1983); Craswell, Tying Requirements in
Competitive Markets: The Consumer Protection Issues, 62 B.U.L. REv. 661 (1982); Flynn,
Antitrust Protection of the Consumer: Myth or Reality?, 13 FORUM 939 (1978).
75. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1558.
76. Id. (quoting Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 605).
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result of the hospital's market p6wer to have anticompetitive consequences. 77
Since every patient undergoing a surgical operation needs the services of an
anesthesiologist, the hospital did not force any such services on unwilling
patients. 78 It is clear, however, that not every patient having x-rays taken
needs an additional interpretation by a radiologist before his doctor can
treat him.
Certainly, if the hospital has a policy requiring a radiologist to read all
x-rays, 79 then the purchase of the subspecialist's interpretation is compelled
by the hospital. The radiologist has acquired the right to charge for inter-
preting every x-ray whether or not it is needed. The result has been to force
a patient seeking medical services at the hospital to accept the additional
reading of the x-rays. The wastefulness of this requirement is most pro-
nounced when the attending physician reads the x-ray himself'0 and treats
the patient without ever consulting the radiologist's report. 81
The hospital policy should also be condemned from another economic
perspective. It results in an "injury to the property" of the patient. In New
Jersey Chiropractic Society v. Radiological Society of New Jersey,82 con-
sumers claimed they were required to make unnecessary expenditures to
engage the services of a radiologist to take x-rays as a result of the alleged
conspiracy of the radiological group to monopolize trade in this area of
health. 83 The court concluded that the consumers were injured in their
property as a direct result of the hospital's insistence upon the administration
of x-rays by a radiologist. 4 The court relied on Cleary v. Chalk81 to find
that "[a] person whose property is diminished by a payment of money
wrongfully induced is injured in his property. ' 86 The Cleary court also found
this "injury to property" principle applied to both a consumer of services
and a consumer of goods. 87 Under the Cleary analysis it is evident that the
hospital policy requiring an additional reading of x-rays by radiologists
wrongfully induces the patient to expend more for x-ray interpretation than
is necessary, causing injury to the patient's property, and thereby justifying
the condemnation of the policy.
77. Id. at 1565.
78. Id. at 1567.
79. Rumple, 422 N.E.2d 1309.
80. The attending physician also bills the patient for reading the x-ray.
81. Rumple, 422 N.E.2d 1309.
82. 156 N.J. Super. 365, 383 A.2d 1182 (1982).
83. Id. at 368, 383 A.2d at 1184.
84. Id. at 371, 383 A.2d at 1185.
85. 159 U.S. App. D.C. 415, 488 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
86. Id. at 1319 n.17 (quoting Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S.
390, 396 (1906)).
87. New Jersey Chiropractic Soc'y, 156 N.J. Super. at 370, 383 A.2d at 1185.
[Vol. 61:521
PATIENT COERCION
V. JUSTIFICATIONS
The two most common justifications given as defenses for tying arrange-
ments are quality control and efficient services. The Supreme Court has been
reluctant to accept such "goodwill" defenses. The Court refused to allow
a quality control justification when the use of contractual quality specifi-
cations was sufficient to protect quality without the use of a tying arrange-
ment.88 The Court has also refused to allow a technical maintenance
justification of insuring satisfactory performance of products, when the only
purpose or effect is to prevent the consumer from using the product of the
competitor. s9
From a hospital administrator's perspective, a flat rule concerning good
medical practice is easier to administer. It is more efficient to compel all
patients to adhere to the rule rather than making decisions regarding excep-
tions.9 The hospital reasons that a flat rule will result in more efficient
delivery of services.
[A flat rule] can increase the hospital's control over operation of the
department, ensure full-time availability of services, lower costs through
standardization of procedures and centralized administration of the de-
partment, permit better scheduling of the use of facilities, facilitate
maintenance of equipment [and] improve supervision of support staff
and working relationships between the staff and physicians .... 9,
Certain rules, such as discharge of patients in wheelchairs, are standard
practices for administrative efficiency. The hospital avoids the inconvenience
of deciding the procedure for a patient's discharge on a case-by-case basis.
There are, however, no economies in having a radiologist interpret all x-
rays. The decision to have x-rays taken of a patient is already made on a
case-by-case basis. Therefore, the hospital is not inconvenienced by an ad-
ditional decision by the physician whether to request a confirmative reading
by a radiologist. Most importantly, the patient and his physician will have
a greater freedom of choice concerning the patient's medical treatment.
The quality argument given by the hospital to defend its policy is that
the rule will generally reduce patient morbidity and mortality and assure
accurate patient diagnosis and treatment, thereby increasing the quality of
patient care.9 2 In the Hyde decision, however, the Court in a footnote rejected
88. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). See also Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1565 n.42 (1984).
89. International Business Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
90. An obvious example of a flat rule is the requirement that all patients must be discharged
from the hospital in a wheelchair.
91. Burnham Hospital, 101 F.T.C. Dec. at 993.
92. Brief of Indiana Hosp. Ass'n, Amicus Curiae at 12, Rumple v. Bloomington Hosp.,
422 N.E.2d 1309 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
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the view that the legality of an arrangement of this kind turns on whether
it was adopted for the purpose of improving patient care.93
Another quality argument given to defend the policy of having radiologists
read every x-ray94 is that it offers malpractice protection for the doctor and
the hospital.95 The patient, however, is not necessarily benefitting from this
policy. The argument for quality control is moot if the precautionary measure
is utilized long after the patient is gone, or never used at all by the doctor.
9 6
While the confirmative x-ray interpretation may aid the doctor in defending
himself in a malpractice suit, it does not retroactively enhance the care
received by the patient. If, on the other hand, the doctor waits to treat the
paient until after reading the report, often filed a few days later,97 negligence
may result for failing to treat the patient promptly. 98 While admittedly there
are instances where a confirmatory report is desirable, it is often an unnec-
essary expense to the patient.9 The dissenting opinion in Rumple recognizes
the uselessness of the mandatory policy requiring radiologists to read all x-
rays. "Here the interpretation and report was but an empty institutional
ritual performed in obedience to a sweeping rule. The [radiologist's] report
was buried, unread, in a file, where it reposed until disinterred by a billing
clerk."' ° When the physician proceeds with treatment before a second read-
93. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1565 n.41.
94. Rumple, 422 N.E.2d at 1318. (The policy of the hospital does not foreclose the general
practitioner from interpreting the x-rays of his or her patient. The policy merely requires that
in addition to the interpretation of the general practitioner, there must be an official interpre-
tation by a physician who possesses the necessary qualifications, i.e., a radiologist.).
95. Rumple, 429 N.E.2d 214 (Pivarnik, J., dissenting) (purpose of this confirmation ra-
diology was to protect everyone in malpractice suits, which is not the duty nor responsibility
of patient).
96. The doctor in Rumple said he did not need the confirmation report and never used it
in his treatment of the patient. Id. The doctor in Alessio v. Crook, 633 S.W.2d 770 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1982), did not consult the x-ray report before discharging the patient.
97. See Alessio, 633 S.W.2d 770. The patient is taken to the radiology department to be
x-rayed. The film is developed as soon as possible. The film is labeled with the patient's name
and identification, date, and hospital number. The film is read and interpreted by one of the
radiologists who dictates into a recorder his interpretation of the film. A stenographer then
transcribes the recording and prepares an x-ray report. The radiologist reviews the report and
initials it if he approves. After the report is initialed, it is ready to be filed in the patient's
chart.
98. See Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974) (failure to give a glaucoma
test in a timely manner was negligence). At a time when cost containment in medical practice
is of major concern, decisions such as Helling could be expected to increase the amount of
defensive medicine being practiced in all fields of medicine. Greenbaum, Current Standards of
Practice in Medicine: The Medical, Judicial, and Legislative Roles, 7 W. ST. U.L. REv. 1, 7
(1979).
99. "While these readings by a radiologist were referred to as 'confirmative interpretations,'
there is nothing in the record that they were ever consulted as such." Rumple, 422 N.E.2d at
1319 (Neal, P.J., dissenting). "A charge to a patient for a service not asked for by the treating
surgeon, not used by the treating surgeon, or consulted by the treating surgeon, or anyone
else" is an unnecessary expense. Id.
100. Id.
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ing of x-rays is made, the required procedure has no impact on the quality
of treatment given, rendering it wholly unnecessary. By permitting a case-
by-case decision about confirmative reports by radiologists, unnecessary pro-
cedures will be reduced, resulting in decreased medical costs.
VI. LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES
While the preservation of high quality health care is a desirable goal, there
are less restrictive alternatives than the hospital's mandatory policy of a
second reading of x-rays by a radiologist which will accomplish such a goal.101
The alternatives to a mandatory policy will reduce unnecessary readings,
thereby decreasing the cost to the patient. One such less restrictive alternative
is to permit the attending physician to decide on a case-by-case basis when
confirmatory radiological reports are necessary. 0 2 This gives the patient,
through his doctor, a choice whether to purchase the independent radiological
interpretation. This alternative allows the doctor to proceed with treatment
based upon his own reading of the x-rays if he deems an additional inter-
pretation unnecessary. In complicated cases, the doctor may seek a confir-
matory report from the radiologist in order to guard against future malpractice
actions. This alternative accomplishes two important objectives in that the
hospital has met its burden of providing high quality medical service because
such confirmatory interpretations are still available to the attending physi-
cian, while the patient's option to choose not to purchase unnecessary ra-
diological services remains open.
A second less restrictive alternative would be to have a standard procedure
whereby the radiologist reads all x-rays, unless the doctor indicates otherwise.
The physician and patient could sign a form indicating that no other reading
is necessary or desirable. While the end result of this second alternative is
the same as the first alternative, the means are different. The first alternative
requires an affirmative act on the part of the doctor for the radiologist to
interpret the x-ray. The second alternative requires a negative constraint
initiated by the doctor against the radiologist to prevent the additional
interpretation of the x-ray. Both alternatives maintain a high standard of
quality control as determined by the attending physician while allowing the
patient an escape from a "forced" mandatory requirement.
A third less restrictive alternative would be to have a required reading of
special types of x-rays. Such a system would predetermine the procedures' 3
101. An illegal tying arrangement will not be excused if there is a less restrictive alternative
to accomplish the end which the business justification purports to serve. Carpa, Inc. v. Ward
Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 47 (5th Cir. 1976); Hyde, 686 F.2d at 292.
102. See. Waxman, supra note 8, at 637-38; Heitler, Health Care and Antitrust, 14 U. TOL.
L. REv. 577, 604 (utilization review to determine whether unnecesary care has been rendered).
103. Such procedures might include neck, back and head injuries, as well as special op-
thomological x-rays.
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in which an additional radiological interpretation would be necessary. This
alternative is less restrictive than a mandatory policy that requires all x-rays
to be interpreted by a radiologist. The physician would, of course, still be
able to acquire a confirmation report in other situations, when he so re-
quested.
CONCLUSION
The health care industry's tremendous growth mandates increased appli-
cation of antitrust law. The Hyde decision establishes the per se rule as the
determinative test of legality of an established tying arrangement. In Rumple,
hospital policy forces the patient to purchase the additional radiological
interpretation (the tied product), incurring unnecessary expenses, in order to
receive treatment at the hospital, to have x-rays taken and to have these
read by the attending physician (the tying product). Such -coercion of the
purchaser is contrary to the goals of antitrust law and should be condemned.
While the goal of providing quality health care is an admirable one, it can
be better achieved by less restrictive alternatives. Such alternatives achieve
the additional goal of cost containment without resulting in the anticom-
petitive effects suffered by the illegal tying arrangement. The hospital policy
of requiring radiologists to read every x-ray is an illegal tying arrangement
and should be denounced as a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
CINDY L. PORTER
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